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INTRODUCTION
Governments around the world introduce programs to spur innovation and the creation of start-
ups. The availability of venture capital is one factor that is considered beneficial for the foundation
and growth of young and innovative companies. Based on the conviction that venture capital can
foster entrepreneurship and thus innovation (Kang et al., 2011), many policy measures are directed
toward establishing favorable conditions for venture capital investments.
To stimulate venture capital investments, governments apply at least four different measures:
First, governments try to reduce the risk of investing in start-ups by directly subsidizing them in
the early development stages or by investing through state-owned venture capital funds. Hence,
venture capitalists aiming to invest in more developed start-ups bear a reduced risk of these start-
ups not being able to persist in the market. Second, governments try to ‘set the table’, that is,
alleviate institutional constraints by investing in basic R&D or reducing the cost of R&D and by
establishing a suitable legal framework so that start-ups have improved conditions to subsist in
the market (Bonini & Alkan, 2009; Lerner, 1999, 2009). Third, venture capitalists need profitable
exit options for their investments in start-ups. In this regard, governments encourage the creation
of viable stock markets for young companies so that venture capitalists have the opportunity to
take portfolio companies public and realize a high return (Black & Gilson, 1998; Bonini & Alkan,
2009; Da Rin et al., 2006). Fourth, the profits of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are both
affected by taxation so that governments use tax breaks to incentivize venture capital investments
(Gompers et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Da Rin et al., 2006, 2011a).
Despite this political interest, it is not completely understood how tax policy influences invest-
ment in venture capital-backed companies and thus the entrepreneurial process. Our analysis sheds
light on this aspect by examining the effect of the capital gains tax on venture capital investment.
Capital gains are the most important source of compensation in the venture capital context (Cum-
ming & MacIntosh, 2006; Cumming & Johan, 2008); therefore, the taxation of these gains could
have a particularly large influence on investments in start-ups. When a venture capitalist provides
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funding for a start-up, he or she wants to achieve high capital gains by exiting the company at
a higher price than that upon entry. The venture capitalist invests only if the taxed capital gains
cover the costs incurred by monitoring and advising the start-up. Consequently, if the government
increases taxes on capital gains, this change should reduce the incentives for venture capitalists to
invest in start-ups, since they have less means to finance and monitor investments. With increasing
tax rates, companies with high monitoring costs will face financing constraints even though their
funding could contribute to innovation and they could become growth companies (Chemmanur
et al., 2014; Ueda & Hirukawa, 2008; Da Rin et al., 2011).
We empirically investigate whether an increase in the capital gains tax rate has an effect on
venture capitalists’ investment decisions in funding start-ups. In a first step, we determine whether
the capital gains tax has an effect on the number of start-ups financed and whether the probability
of success of the start-ups that receive venture capital increases or decreases with the tax rate. In a
second step, we study whether the capital gains tax affects venture capitalists’ decisions to continue
financing start-ups in consecutive funding rounds. Existing studies have exclusively concentrated
on the question of tax effects on the investment volume of venture capital within an economy
(Bonini & Alkan, 2009; Gompers et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Da Rin et al., 2006). Our study
expands this literature by considering the investment decisions of venture capitalists. This allows
deeper insight into the effects the capital gains tax has on the innovativeness of an economy that is
influenced by the number and quality of start-ups.
To determine the effects of tax rates on venture capitalists’ investment decisions, we use the
data from the Thomson One Database on companies that received venture capital between 2000
and 2012. The analysis considers not only companies that received venture capital for the first
time, but also those that received further funding rounds. In addition, the exit type for the start-
up is determined to identify whether a successful exit could be achieved. We classify a company
as successful if it is eventually acquired or taken public (Gompers et al., 2008). In total, our
dataset includes 32 countries for which detailed characteristics of the capital gains tax are carefully
determined. Since venture capitalists typically invest for a holding period of two to seven years and
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hold a substantial stake in the company, the corresponding tax rates are applied. In our analysis,
we measure the effect of the capital gains tax on four different dependent variables: the number
of financed firms, the number of successful firms, the probability of a financed company being
successful, and the probability of a firm receiving follow-up investment. To guide our empirics,
we develop a theoretical model in which an investor responds to rising taxes by selecting firms
to fund. This model predicts that an increase in the capital gains tax rate should result in fewer
firms financed, fewer successful firms, and – for start-ups in later development stages – in a lower
probability of receiving follow-up investment.
Our results support the theoretical predictions that higher capital gains tax rates indeed lead
to fewer companies receiving investments by venture capitalists. In addition, the number of firms
realizing a successful exit is reduced by an increase in the capital gains tax rate. In our data, an
increase in the capital gains tax rate of one percentage point is associated with around 1.04 fewer
companies per 10 million inhabitants receiving their first investment. This is a reduction of 3.6
percent relative to a mean of 29.27 new companies per 10 million inhabitants. Interestingly, we
find that the ratio of successful companies rises with increasing tax rates. These results point to
a selection effect of taxes. Venture capitalists seem to be able to pick the companies to invest in
more diligently when tax rates are high. This finding provides some evidence for the question
discussed in the literature of whether venture capitalists are able to identify potentially more suc-
cessful companies during their initial due diligence process (Bertoni et al., 2011; Brander et al.,
2002; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; Dimov et al., 2007; Lerner, 1994). The results are corroborated
when we analyze venture capital investments in consecutive funding rounds. Companies have a
lower probability of receiving further funding rounds when capital gains taxes are high. How-
ever, if the capital gains tax was high at the time of the first funding, the company has a higher
probability of receiving funding in consecutive rounds, again pointing at a selection effect.
Our study contributes to understanding the effect of taxes on venture capital investment by con-
sidering new outcome variables that have so far often been neglected: the probability of receiving
follow-up investment, the probability of a company’s success, and the proportion of successful
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firms.1 Prior studies focus on the effect of taxes on the investment volume of venture capital funds
in an economy and therefore cannot consider outcomes related to company success. This focus is
astonishing, because policy interventions – such as a change in the capital gains tax rate – should
consider the effect of taxes on success variables, since they measure an important aspect: The
reinvestment probability is correlated with firm survival and only surviving firms can contribute to
innovation and become growth companies. The propensity of being successful is important since it
is one measure of how efficient entrepreneurs and the venture capital industry generate these new
firms and products.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section outlines the relevant
literature and develops a theory about the proposed causal channel of the capital gains tax on
venture capitalists’ investment decisions. We then discuss our sample construction. The empirical
specification is outlined in the method section, before the results are described. After a discussion
of the results, the last section concludes the paper.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Literature
Venture capital funds are often the only source of funding for young high-risk companies
(Elango et al., 1995; Gompers et al., 1998).2 For such start-up companies, traditional bank fi-
nancing is unavailable, since they do not have assets that can be pledged as collateral. Instead of
demanding collateral, a venture capital fund intensively monitors these start-ups after investing so
that the risk of exploitation of private benefits is reduced and entrepreneurial effort is incentivized
(Becker & Hellmann, 2003; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004; Gompers et al., 1998). The monitoring
effort renders investments more costly for venture capital funds, limiting the possibility of simulta-
neosly investing in numerous start-ups simultaneously (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997). Consequently,
ventures with high monitoring costs face financing constraints (Elango et al., 1995; Gompers et al.,
1(Gompers et al., 2008) and (Brander et al., 2010) also consider the determinants of success probability of venture
capital investments as outcome variables.
2We use the terms venture, start −up, and company interchangeably throughout the article.
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1998). Nevertheless, these start-ups could contribute to innovation and become growth companies.
Therefore, the provision of venture capital to young and innovative companies is often desired
from a political point of view. Since monitoring costs can hardly be influenced, governments try
to use different policy measures to increase the returns of venture capital investments (Bonini &
Alkan, 2009). Tax policy is the most direct way of influencing the venture capitalist’s return, since
the capital gains tax directly reduces the sales price of companies when investments are exited
(Poterba, 1989a,b; Gompers et al., 1998).
To improve their bargaining position in the monitoring process, venture capitalists do not in-
vest the required funds all at once but provide them in consecutive funding rounds. That means
that, after a certain period, venture capitalists evaluate whether to continue investing in a start-up,
depending on the expected net present value of the investment. The investment in a start-up is
profitable if the investor is able to sell the acquired share of the company for a profit. The most
profitable exit routes are selling the start-up either to another company in a trade sale or to the
public in an initial public offering (IPO). These two exit types deliver the highest returns for ven-
ture capitalists (Cochrane, 2005; Dai et al., 2012; Dimov et al., 2007; Nahata, 2008; Pollock et al.,
2009).
In our analysis, we consider the investment decisions of a representative venture capitalist who
aims to achieve a minimum return on investment. The venture capitalist closes a funding round for
the venture if the expected gains from the investment, that is, the expected sales price net of taxes
less the expected costs associated with the investment, are high enough that the required minimum
return is met or exceeded.3 Thus, the probability of venture capitalists providing funding to young
companies increases if tax policy is designed so that the venture capitalists’ potential returns are
high.
The capital gains tax is considered to be the most decisive tax in the context of venture capital
investments, since it is levied on the difference between the sales price and the amount invested.
3The minimum rate of return is the so-called hurdle rate. The minimum return the venture capital fund managers
expect is also determined by the cost and expenditure associated with the investment. Among other factors, this
minimum return is influenced by the risk-free rate of return and the capital gains tax rate that would have to be paid
on the return. Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf (2011) use a similar model for venture capital to explain innovation waves.
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Several studies document from a theoretical point of view that the capital gains tax directly reduces
the incentives of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist (Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2004; Poterba,
1989a,b). The venture capitalist’s return is decreased by the capital gains tax, as is the venture
capitalist’s incentive to invest in, advise, and monitor the venture (Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2003).
Poterba (1989a) argues that this is a demand-driven effect, since an increase in the capital gains tax
rate induces some entrepreneurs to take up regular employment, reducing the demand for venture
capital. The author negates a supply effect because most limited partners of venture capital funds
are tax exempt, especially in the United States. However, this argument neglects that the tax
exemption of limited partners is not the case in several other countries and venture capital fund
managers’ compensation can be taxed as capital gains, which also triggers incentives.
Empirical studies on the capital gains tax mainly confirm the theoretical predictions. Gompers
et al. (1998) find in a time series for the United States from 1978 to 1994 that higher individual
capital gains taxes lead to less venture capital raised and to lower fund commitments. Since their
study is also based on a U.S. sample, they argue that the effect is mainly demand driven by the tax
exemption of limited partners. Whereas Jeng & Wells (2000) do not find an effect of the individual
capital gains tax rate on the investment volume of venture capital in a panel of 21 countries from
1986 to 1995, Da Rin et al. (2006) detect a significantly negative effect regarding the corporate
capital gains tax rate on the volume for early-stage and high-tech investments in a panel study on
14 countries from 1988 to 2001.
In contrast to prior studies, our analysis does not consider the overall investment volume of
venture capital in a particular country (Da Rin et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells,
2000) but the single investment decisions of venture capitalists. It is not clear through which chan-
nel capital gains tax rates influence investment volumes and whether changes in volume directly
lead to the changed investment decisions of venture capital fund managers. An increase in the
total volume might, for example, lead not to a larger number of start-ups receiving financing but,
rather, to higher average investment amounts provided. Thus, size alone is not a satisfactory mea-
sure for determining whether changes in the capital gains tax rate affect venture capitalists’ single
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investment decisions.
Beyond that, lower capital gains tax rates could have an effect on venture success, since with
lower taxes to pay implies venture capitalists have more means for providing monitoring and advice
and can hence increase the success probability of their ventures. Therefore, besides the initial
decision of whether to invest in a start-up at all, we consider the association of the capital gains tax
rate and consecutive investment decisions in further funding rounds, as well as the probability of
a successful exit. Venture capitalists adopt a thorough due diligence process to detect promising
investments. This process should be carried out diligently and independently for each venture to
determine the future probability of a start-up’s success. However, venture capitalists could become
more diligent in deciding which start-ups are promising investments when capital gains tax rates
are high, since their returns are reduced by a higher percentage of taxes.4
Evidence on the potential mechanism of the success probability is scarce so far. Gordon (1998)
finds that the survival rate of newly founded companies is low if personal tax rates are too low. The
author ascribes this effect to efficiency losses, since too many start-ups – not just promising ones
– are founded during periods of low tax rates. Gompers et al. (2008) investigate the effect of the
company-specific market-to-book ratio on a venture capital fund’s number of investments in young
companies and their success probability in a given industry. Among other things, their results indi-
cate that venture capitalists might have the ability to detect more prosperous investments initially
because they find that venture capitalists with vast industry experience have a higher chance of
achieving a successful exit. Brander et al. (2010) examine the influence of governmental support
on the probability of venture capital funds realizing a successful exit. They find that moderate
government support is helpful in this goal, whereas strong government participation is harmful.5
Our analysis could run into identification issues, since venture capital investors may try to exert
influence on policy makers to change the capital gains tax rates in their interest. This influence is,
however, not very probable, since the capital gains tax usually applies to all capital gains investors
4Such selection effects due to high costs associated with investments are described in the heterogeneous firm
literature started by Melitz (2003).
5Gompers & Lerner (2000) and Amit et al. (2002), among others, also consider the success probability a dependent
variable.
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realize, that is including dividends and gains from investments in stocks and real estate, which
make up the highest share of all capital gains in an economy. The influence of interested parties
others than venture capitalists on policy makers is thus presumably higher in terms of power to
influence the political process.
Looking at venture capitalists’ estimated capital gains from IPOs in relation to all capital gains
occurring in the United States indicates that venture capitalists do not have a strong influence. If
the post offer value of venture capital-backed IPOs is generously taken as a proxy measure for
venture capitalists’ gains, the share of these gains to total capital gains between 2000 and 2009
is, on average, only around 8 percent only (see Table 1; for a similiar comparison: (Poterba,
1989a)). This low share implies that the capital gains tax is not the main tax that policy makers
will change upon the influence of venture capitalists because the share of capital gains realized
by venture capitalists is comparably small. Further, the capital gains tax rate might be changed
mainly for the purpose of stimulating entrepreneurship. However, two reasons indicate that this
argument is not the most persuasive. First, we could not detect that changes in capital gains taxes
were introduced to foster entrepreneurship, since changes occur infrequently and not according to
economic situations. Within our sample period, there was, for example, only one change in the
tax rate in the United States, in 2003. The change of the capital gains tax rate was initiated within
the scope of the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, which aimed to alleviate
the general economic downturn caused by the terror attacks of 2001. However, the reform’s main
target group was not entrepreneurs or venture capitalists.
[Table 1 about here.]
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we model the influence of a change in the capital gains tax on investment in
a start-up. We consider two periods. In the first period, the venture capital investor considers
whether it is worth investing in a start-up. The venture capital investor invests in the start-up if
the expected profit from doing so is positive. Before investing, the venture capitalist can observe a
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return η about the profitability of this particular start-up. The total investment amount the venture
capitalist provides for a start-up is fixed and denoted I. Every dollar the venture capitalist invests
is associated with opportunity costs c for monitoring and supporting the start-up, where c is larger
than one and the same for all investors.
In the second period, after the investment period, the venture capitalist decides to exit the
investment and sells the company at the stock exchange (IPO) or to another company (acquisition),
realizing a capital gain if the start-up showed successful development. At this point, the venture
capitalist learns the true sales price from the investment, which is the expected return η from
period one and the unknown random component ε , that is, η + ε . The variable ε is assumed to
be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance σε . The venture capitalist sells the
company if the realized return is positive, that is, η + ε > 0. In case the venture capitalist can
realize a successful exit – through an IPO or an acquisition – the state levies a capital gains tax on
the difference between the sales price and the amount τ((η + ε)I − I) originally invested by the
venture capitalist, with τ as the tax rate.
The expected return perceived by the venture capitalist in period one is given by η+ = E[(η +
ε)|η+ε > 0], that is, η+ is the expectation of the return, given that a successful exit can be realized
with the venture. Since the venture capitalist has to pay taxes on the positive return realized with
the investment and has to pay a cost c for monitoring and supporting the venture, the venture
capitalist’s expected pay-off Π before investing in period one can be formally written as follows:
Π(η+,τ) = (1− τ) ·η+ · I − I + τ · I − c · I (1)
One aspect of interest is how the probability for a start-up receiving venture capital changes
with an increase in the capital gains tax rate. For ease of exposition, we compare high tax rates
τhigh with low tax rates τ low. From (1), it follows that every start-up with a positive expected
after tax profit (Π ≥ 0) is financed. This condition implies that there is a threshold level η of the
expected return η+ above which all start-ups receive funding from a venture capitalist, given a
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specific tax rate:6




If taxes increase from τ low to τhigh, all ventures characterized by a signal η ∈ [η low,ηhigh)
no longer receive venture capital, since the venture capitalist does not expect a positive pay-off
Pi(η+,τ) due to the increase in the capital gains tax rate. Figure 1 illustrates this situation. Con-
sequently, the number of investments that receive venture capital decreases, which is depicted by
a higher cut-off line ηhigh.
This relation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The number of companies receiving venture capital investment decreases with an
increase in the capital gains tax rate.
This line of argumentation can be extended if a start-up receives several funding rounds. If
taxes increase in between two financing rounds, the marginal expected return η that a start-up
has to deliver increases in the eyes of the venture capitalist, leading to a lower probability of the
venture receiving a follow-up financing round and, thus, of it persisting in the market.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The probability of receiving a follow-up funding round decreases with an increase
in the capital gains tax in between two funding rounds. Thus, an increase in the capital gains tax
reduces the number of start-ups financed.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Next, we describe the effects of taxes on the joint probability of a venture capitalist providing
funding for a company and achieving a successful exit with it. The venture capitalist realizes
a successful exit when a positive return is achievedfrom an investment in a company. For this
condition to be met, the unknown part of the final return ε must not be negative enough to outweigh
the positive value of η , that is, if (ε >−η holds. Since the capital gains tax rate τ influences neither
6All proofs are available from the authors on request.
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η nor ε , it follows that the capital gains tax does not influence the probability of a successful exit,
given the company already received an investment. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, an increase
in the capital gains tax rate reduces the number of start-ups receiving a first funding round and the
probability of a start-up receiving a follow-up funding round from a venture capitalist. Therefore,
if fewer companies are funded with increasing tax rates, fewer start-ups have the chance of being
potentially successful which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the number of eventually successful
start-ups.
[Figure 2 about here.]
According to Propositions 1 and 3, an increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the total
number of financed companies, as well as the number of successful companies. However, which
effect dominates in the aggregate is of interest. It can be stated that, if the capital gains tax rate
increases marginally, the venture capitalist will decide to no longer finance the start-up with a
marginal positive expected return η . This start-up has the lowest probability of achieving a suc-
cessful exit, since its signal η is expected to be the lowest of all the start-ups that receive funding.
Therefore, if the capital gains tax rate is increased, the start-up with the lowest success probability
will no longer receive venture capital. Since this is the start-up whose successful exit is the least
probable, the success probability for all companies, on average, that receive financing should rise
with increasing tax rates.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The average success probability of all companies receiving investment for the first
time is higher for a higher capital gains tax rate.
This logic can be transferred to the venture capitalist’s decision of whether to provide a follow-
up funding round. If the start-up faced high capital gains tax rates at the time of the first funding, its
probability of receiving a follow-up funding round is higher than if it faced low tax rates (holding
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the current tax rate constant). The reason is that a start-up facing a high tax rate has, on average,
a higher signal η and a higher probability of developing successfully, so that the probability of
receiving venture capital in consecutive funding rounds is increased, leading to this proposition.
Proposition 5 If the capital gains tax rate is high at the time of the first funding, the probability of
the company receiving a follow-up funding round is increased, since the company has, on average,
a higher expected pay-off Π.
With the help of Figure 3, the idea of Propositions 4 and 5 can be illustrated with a bivariate
uniform density distribution. To facilitate understanding, we define four disjoint sets: A comprises
start-ups with (η ,ε) that are successful but only financed if the capital gains tax is low; B comprises
successful start-ups that are financed when capital gains taxes are high; C consists of start-ups that
do not deliver a successful exit and which are financed only in the case of low tax rates; and D
comprises unsuccessful companies that are financed in the case of capital gains tax rates being
high. Then A∪B consists of all successful firms and B∪D comprises all firms that are financed in
the case of high tax rates. Furthermore, PX is the probability of a firm belonging to set X .
With high tax rates (ηhigh), the probability of a venture capitalist realizing a successful exit
with a start-up that received funding, PB
PB∪D
, is quite substantial and, as illustrated in Figure 3, far
above 50 percent. In contrast, as illustrated, when the tax rates are low (η low), the probability of a
start-up being successful given that it received funding, PA∪B
PA∪B∪C∪D
, is lower and around 50 percent.
The reason for this decrease can be understood when considering the relative success probabilities
given high and low tax rates. The relative average probability of a start-up’s success considering all
funded start-ups in the case of low tax rates, PA
PA∪C
, is far lower than the relative average probability
of a start-up’s success considering all funded start-ups in the case of high tax rates, PB
PB∪D
.




For our dataset, we assemble the capital gains tax rates of 32 countries from 2000 to 2012 from
the Ernst&Young Global Executive tax guides and the tax handbooks published by the International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (see Table 2. We calculate the tax rate for an investor who holds
a substantial stake in a company for about five years. If there is dedicated capital gains tax relief
for venture capital investors, such as ’relief on disposal of a business’ in the United Kingdom,
we assume it applies. This relief, for example, reduces the capital gains tax rate from a usual 28
percent to 10 percent if the venture capital investor owned more than 5 percent of the shares of the
company and has a board seat. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the individual capital gains tax
rate for eight major economies.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
The tax data are matched with venture capital investments from the Thomson One Banker
database. Our dataset contains information on consecutive funding rounds for a large sample of
venture capital-financed companies, including the name, country, founding date, date of the invest-
ment round, round description, and final company status.7 To focus on venture capital investments,
we select all rounds related to venture capital, such as seed, early stage, expansion, or later stage
rounds. Rounds related to private equity (e.g. , a management buyout or a leveraged buyout) are
deleted. Additionally, we restrict our dataset to companies that received their first investment after
1999, since the Thomson One Banker database has good international coverage only after this date
(Brander et al., 2010).
7The total investment amount of one round is usually provided by several venture capitalists. If this is the case,
these investments are aggregated to one round. Funding rounds do not necessarily correspond to the development
stages of the company, that is, a start-up can have several funding rounds during its early stage.
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Our data cover 32 different countries from 2000 to 2012 and include 76,852 funding rounds of
33,949 companies.
Dependent variables
To be able to analyze the number and percentage of successful firms, we have to define suc-
cess. We use a classification based on a company’s exit type. This appears reasonable, because
Phalippou & Gottschalg (2009) show that exit types are correlated with the returns of venture cap-
ital investments. In line with common literature on venture capital, the following Thomson One
Banker exit types for the investee company are classified as successful: acquisitions, pending ac-
quisition, merger, in registration for an IPO, and those that went public. If an investee company
is defunct or bankrupt, it is considered a failure. Since the database does not provide any further
detailed information on companies that have an active status since years, we conservatively assume
that they are classified as failures. This classification is common in venture capital research and
similar to that used by Gompers et al. (2008).8
For our analyses, we distinguish two sets of data. For the first set of analyses, the dataset is
aggregated at the country-year level and contains three different dependent variables: The first de-
pendent variable, #Firms, is the number of firms receiving their first venture capital investment in a
particular country and year. The second dependent variable, #Success, is the number of companies
that realize a successful exit. We standardize both these measures by the population size of the
respective countries and years following Da Rin et al. (2006). Dividing the number of successful
companies with the total number of first investments yields the percentage of successful firms,
%Success, the third dependent variable. The second set of analyses aggregates the data at the firm
level in order to analyze the effect of venture capitalists’ investment decisions on a single company.
The dependent variable, Investment, is a dummy that indicates for every investment round whether
there was a subsequent funding round or whether the venture capitalist realized a successful exit.
8According to their data description, Gompers et al. (2008) do not include the pending acquisition category as
a successful exit. However, it seems reasonable to include it, since the category in registration for an IPO is also
included. A similar classification is used by other authors (Hochberg et al., 2007; Brander et al., 2010). These articles
exclude mergers from successful exits. Our results are robust to excluding this exit type.
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If either is the case, the variable is set equal to one and to zero otherwise.
Independent variables
The independent variable of primary interest for the first set of analyses is the capital gains tax
rate lagged by one year (initial capital gains tax). This is the same timing assumption as that of
Gompers et al. (2008). To analyze in the second set the effect of the capital gains tax rate on the
probability of receiving a follow-up investment round, the initial capital gains tax in place at the
time of the first funding as well as the capital gains tax of the current funding round are used as
independent variables. The assumption about the timing of the variables is the same as in the first
set of analyses, which is sensible, since funding rounds have an average duration of about one year.
Control variables
All specifications include country and year-fixed effects. The following control variables are
used: the income tax, the corporate income tax rate, and the dividend tax rate control for tax
changes that might be correlated across different tax rates. All these tax changes might be relevant,
since they set incentives for employees to become entrepreneurs or tax the income retrieved from
start-ups. The market-to-book ratio is included to act as a public market signal, as for Gompers
et al. (2008), and as a proxy for generally perceived investment opportunities. Additionally, we
control for gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a signal of the state of economic environ-
ment. Industrial and academic R&D control for R&D expenditures, which could create spillover
to venture capital investment (Gompers et al., 1998; Da Rin et al., 2006). When using firm-level
data in the second set of the analyses, we further include funding round, industry, and development
stage fixed effects. Throughout the analyses, the standard errors reported below the coefficients
are clustered at the country level to account for the correlation of tax rates within a country over




The summary statistics as well as the correlation table for all the variables are given in Tables
3 and 4.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
We analyze our propositions using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. In the
first set of analyses with the data aggregated at the country–year level, we consider the effect of
the capital gains tax on the number of start-ups receiving venture capital for the first time. For
this analysis, the estimation method is an OLS regression weighted by the population size. In the
second set of analyses of the firm–level data, the estimation method is simple OLS.
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions testing Propositions 1 to 4. Column (1) shows the
effect of a change in the capital gains tax rate on the number of firms per 10 million inhabitants. The
coefficient of -1.04 is significant at the 1 percent level and suggests that an increase in the capital
gains tax rate by one percentage point leads to about 1.04 fewer companies receiving venture
capital per 10 million inhabitants. In particular, this estimation signifies that a tax increase of
one percentage point leads to a reduction of 32.14 companies receiving their first investment for
a population such as that of the United States (with 309 million inhabitants in 2010). In other
words, this effect implies 2.64 percent fewer companies relative to the median of 1,215 companies
receiving venture capital per year for the first time in the United States over our sample period. This
finding supports Propositions 1 and 2, which predict a reduced probability of receiving venture
capital if the capital gains tax rate is increased.
[Table 5 about here.]
In the second column of Table 5, the effects for the number of successful firms standardized by
population size as the dependent variable are estimated. According to these estimates, an increase
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in the capital gains tax rate by one percentage point should reduce the number of successful firms
per 10 million inhabitants by 0.29; that is. such a tax increase leads to a 6.45 percent decrease
relative to the mean of 4.50 successful firms per 10 million people. In the third column, the effect
of a tax rate increase on the proportion of successful firms is predicted. The results show that
increasing the capital gains tax rate by one percentage point is associated with a 0.68 percentage
point higher probability of achieving a successful exit. The estimated coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level. The average probability of exiting an investment via an
IPO or an acquisition is around 25.06 percent for the United States in our sample. Therefore, a
one percentage point tax increase leads to a 2.71 percent increase in the probability of realizing
a successful exit relative to the mean. This finding implies that our empirical estimates support
our theoretical prediction made in Proposition 4 of a selection effect of taxes: A firm’s success
probability should increase, on average, with increasing capital gains tax rates.
[Table 6 about here.]
The effect of the capital gains tax rate on the probability of a firm receiving follow-up funding
rounds is estimated in Table 6. Considering the effect of the capital gains tax rate in place when
the follow-up funding round is closed in column (1), we find a negative influence of the capital
gains tax rate of 1.64 on the probability of receiving another funding round which is significantly
different from zero at the 1 percent level. With an average reinvestment probability of 63.91 percent
in our sample, such a tax increase leads to a 2.56 percent lower probability of receiving a follow-up
funding round relative to the mean.
According to Proposition 5, the probability of receiving a follow-up funding round should
increase if the capital gains tax rate in place at the time of the first funding increases. To test this
effect, we add the inital capital gains tax” rate, which is the tax rate in force a year before the first
venture capital investment in the start-up, as an explanatory variable in the second column. The
effect of the capital gains tax remains statistically significantly negative in this case. Interestingly,
we find that a one percentage point higher initial capital gains tax rate is associated with a 0.45
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percentage point higher probability of receiving follow-up funding, on average.9 These findings
again corroborate the selection effect of taxes predicted in Proposition 5. If the capital gains tax
rate is high when a start-up receives its first funding round, the probability of this start-up receiving
follow-up funding rounds or achieving a successful exit is higher. Thus, venture capitalists seem
to choose more diligently the start-ups in which to invest if capital gains tax rates are high and they
seem to be able to assess their future success probability.
Robustness
We conduct a number of robustness tests. Since our analysis covers a wide time span from 2000
to 2012, our data include two crisis periods that might affect the results. The tech bubble reached
its peak in March 2000 and deflated during 2001. The financial crisis showed its effects toward the
end of our sample period, in 2009 and 2010. If, for example, during such a crisis the government
introduced a series of measures to support the entrepreneurial sector and a tax change occurred at
the same time, our estimates would misleadingly reflect the overall effect of those measures and not
just that of the tax change. However, if this is not the case, we could lose information by restricting
our sample period. To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we repeat our regressions with
a different time span. Table 7 shows the results for a sample period ranging from 2002 to 2008
without any crisis. The results show that our main results remain unaffected. The mean estimates
of all coefficients concerning the number of firms, the success probability, as well as the probability
of receiving a follow-up funding round are of similar magnitude. Only the coefficient of the effect
of the capital gains tax on the number of firms is barely not statistically different from zero at
conventional levels (p-value of 0.126); however, at -1.59, it is even a bit larger than the mean
estimate in the full sample.
[Table 7 about here.]
Another concern is that the results are driven by our timing assumption of considering the
capital gains tax rate in place a year before the investment took place. To alleviate this concern, we
9Note that we do not control for the funding round number in specification (2). The funding round number a
company achieves depends largely on the industry and should therefore not be used as an explanatory variable.
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rerun our regressions by considering the tax rates two years before the funding (lagged regressors)
and the year of the funding decision (forward regressors). Table 8 shows the respective results.
The results remain basically unchanged for the analysis with lagged regressors. Only the effect
of the initial capital gains tax rate for follow-up investment vanishes. For the regressions with the
regressors measured at the time of the first investment, the statistically significant effects mostly
cannot be confirmed. The reason for this effect may be that not enough time lapsed for many of
the tax changes to materialize and take effect immediately for the funding of the start-ups if the
tax change is assumed to have occurred the year of the funding decision. Our results of the main
regressions are hence unaffected by this analysis.
[Table 8 about here.]
Our sample covers a large database of international venture capital investments. However,
while international coverage is certainly a strength, it is also likely to distort our main results,
since too many small countries with only a few venture capital investments affect the findings.
Therefore, we address this issue by conducting our regressions only with countries that make more
than 500 venture capital investments a year (see Table 9). This analysis gives us confidence that
our findings of the main regressions are reliable, since the coefficients and significances for the
capital gains tax are very similar when considering only more active venture capital economies.
In further robustness tests, not tabulated here, we re-estimate the regression for the first round
without using analytic weights. The results remain largely unchanged; only the coefficients for
the number of firms and the number of successful firms become insignificant. Again, the results
remain unchanged from our main regression results and thus do not alter our conclusions.
[Table 9 about here.]
DISCUSSION
Our study examines the influence the capital gains tax rate has on venture capitalists’ invest-
ment decisions. Specifically, we concentrate on the effects of the number of companies funded and
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on their success. Our analysis is based on several theoretical predictions explaining the rationale
behind the funding decisions of venture capitalists in the context of the capital gains tax burden.
The predictions are supported by our internationally based empirical analysis. Hence, the results
provide evidence that the capital gains tax influences venture capitalists’ incentives in funding
start-ups and – due to the common practice in the venture capital industry of providing consecutive
funding rounds – also has an impact on start-up success. These findings contribute to the literature
of venture capitalists’ funding decisions in general and the influence of macroeconomic factors on
decision making in particular. They advance our understanding of the impact of the capital gains
tax as a specific macroeconomic factor. Previous studies often examine the combined influence
of several macroeconomic factors on venture capital investment, the capital gains tax being just
one among several (Bonini & Alkan, 2009; Gompers et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Da Rin
et al., 2006). Since our study concentrates on the capital gains tax and models its effect in detail,
we are able to derive conclusions on the specific impact of this tax rate. By and large, our results
complement previous research on the negative impact of the capital gains tax burden on venture
capitalists’ willingness to provide funding for start-ups but we find more specific results due to the
consideration of new dependent variables.
One contribution of our analysis is that we outline a theoretical framework that predicts the
effects of the capital gains tax on the funding of ventures and their success. The theoretical model
is then tested on a large international sample, which allows us to test the predictions of the model
empirically. Hence, our analysis provides empirical evidence of whether theoretically expected
reactions really occur. The results have important implications for public policy regarding how
mechanisms induced by the capital gains taxation affect the venture capital sector and how public
policy can intervene to guide venture capital investments in the desired direction.
We extend prior research that focuses on the impact of the capital gains tax on the total volume
invested in the venture capital industry in a specific country. Our analysis goes beyond the effect
of changes in tax rates on the whole investment volume and concentrates on the single investment
decisions of venture capitalists of whether to provide funding for a start-up. This aspect is partic-
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ularly interesting because it allows for a more direct measure of the impact on the innovativeness
of an economy than looking at aggregated investment volumes alone. By considering the effect of
changes in capital gains tax rates on the number of start-ups that receive venture capital, deductions
can be made on the direct effect of how many start-ups receive the opportunity to drive forth their
innovative products and services. Our findings reveal that an increase in the capital gains tax leads
to a reduction of start-ups receiving venture capital. This result implies, first, that an increase in
the tax rate leads to fewer companies obtaining sufficient financial means to expand their idea as
planned and hence, presumably, to less innovation within an economy.
Beyond the effect on the first funding probability, our study considers the effect on the further
development and success probability of start-ups. We can thus isolate the effect of changes in the
capital gains tax at the level of single portfolio companies, which is not possible in aggregated
analyses. The procedure allows us to obtain a more precise picture of venture capitalists’ decision-
making processes and their determining factors, extending prior literature on these aspects. Our
findings indicate that an increase in the capital gains tax leads to a lower probability for a once
funded venture of receiving another funding round, again pointing out a harmful effect of the tax
for the growth and survival probability of ventures. However, when considering the initial capital
gains tax rate that was in place at the beginning of a start-up’s funding history, we find that the
probability of ventures receiving further funding rounds is increased when the initial capital gains
tax is high. This result is particularly interesting because it indicates that, when tax rates are
high, venture capitalists seem to pick companies that they consider more successful. Hence, we
contribute to the literature on venture capital with evidence indicating the existence of the so-called
selection effect, that is, that, at the time of their first funding decision, venture capitalists have the
ability to judge to a certain extent how successful a venture might be. The potential of venture
capitalists having this ability is a contentious issue in the literature (Bertoni et al., 2011; Brander
et al., 2002; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; Dimov et al., 2007; Lerner, 1994; Wuebker et al., 2014).
The selection effect is further confirmed when using the proportion of successful companies
as a new dependent variable in this context. The results reveal that the proportion of successful
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companies is also increased when the capital gains tax increases. Consequently, not only does the
capital gains tax seem to have a positive effect in terms of receiving further funding rounds within
a start-up’s life but also venture capitalists seem to choose start-ups that give them a higher chance
of realizing a profitable exit in the future. Thus, this analysis supports the outcome that a selection
effect prevails and that venture capitalists are apparently able to judge the success probability of
ventures, since they predominantly invest in companies with a higher success probability when tax
rates are increased. These findings are stable to several robustness tests.
One can conclude that the capital gains tax seems to work like a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, it harms the entrepreneurial sector, since venture capitalists provide funding for fewer
start-ups if their potential profits are taxed at a high capital gains tax. On the other hand, venture
capitalists seem to choose more diligently which companies to invest in when tax rates are high
and apparently fund start-ups with a higher success probability in the first place.
Our results not only provide theoretical contributions, but also have implications in, for exam-
ple, policy making. As could be shown, the capital gains tax has a negative effect on the funding
of start-ups by venture capitalists and a high tax rate hampers thier creation and development and
the entrepreneurial sector. Therefore, the harmful effect of a high capital gains tax rate cannot be
neglected. However, an increase in the tax can also lead to the selection of only the more promising
ventures, so that the financing capabilities of venture capitalists concentrate more on the develop-
ment of start-ups that contribute most to the innovativeness of an economy. It would now be of
great interest to determine something like an ’optimal’ capital gains tax rate, but this request can
hardly be fulfilled, since the effects induced by the capital gains tax evidently vary in different
legal settings and different countries. Since the capital gains tax is a rather broad tax on all types
of capital gains and not only those relevant to the venture capital sector, one might recommment
that policy makers concentrate on instruments tailored to reducing the capital gains tax burden
specifically for venture capital investors.
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Limitations
As with any empirical study, our analysis is not devoid of limitations. First, our sample contains
many companies that have an active status. They are classified as failures because there is often
no information available from Thomson Reuters on their development since several years and it
is therefore reasonable to assume that these companies are no longer in the market. However, it
might also be the case that the holding periods of these companies are simply longer than usual and
that they contribute to innovation and create jobs. We therefore test the robustness of our results if
these companies are not classified as failures and find that our results remain basically unchanged.
Our dataset comprises a large number of countries and a rather substantial period, from 2000
to 2012. However, since programs fostering entrepreneurship were introduced by public policy
only during the last 15 years in many countries and since tax rates are often not changed every
year, an investigation of a longer period might be desirable. Unfortunately, the data provided by
Thomson Reuters on venture capital investments are not very detailed or reliable prior to 2000, so
that extending the sample period to an earlier time period is not reasonable. The main effects of the
capital gains taxation on venture capital investments can hence be tested on our dataset. What is
not possible, however, because the period is too short, is the measurement of the returns generated
by the funded start-ups to economic growth. To determine these effects, the sample period would
have to be longer.
Future research
To further advance our understanding of the effects of the capital gains tax on venture capital
investments, future research could examine how the capital gains tax affects the funding of young
companies, taking more detailed performance measures into account. Since only the exit type
is available as a proxy for success in the Thomson Reuters database, we could not consider the
typical specific performance measures that venture capitalists realize from single investments, such
as internal rates of return or the money multiples. Venture capitalists are extremely reluctant to
publish such confidential measures; however, it would be of great value if reasearchers had access
24
to these data to investigate the effects the capital gains tax has on venture capitalists’ investment
decisions when knowing the specific realized returns of single investments.
Venture capital is an important source of financing for start-ups. However, other investors
support ventures in the early stages of development, such as business angels and crowdfunding
investors. We did not evaluate the effects of changes of the capital gains tax on the decisions of
these investor types. For example, if the relevant data were available, future research could analyze
the tax effects for other types of investors to determine whether high capital gains taxes harm not
only venture capital investments but also other capital sources that ventures typically use.
Our study concentrates on the effect of changes in the capital gains tax rate on venture capital
investments as one very decisive tax influencing venture capitalists’ decision making. An avenue
for future research would be to analyze whether further tax instruments that are relevant to start-
ups and their investors create incentives or distort decision making, such as loss carryforward or
loss carryover provisions or corporate income tax rate reductions for young companies.
Venture creation and fostering entrepreneurship are becoming increasingly important in many
emerging economies, in the form of social entrepreneurship as well. It would be useful for future
research to go beyond the geographical scope of our sample and examine the incentives of the
capital gains tax for the entrepreneurial sector in emerging economies.
CONCLUSION
This study offers a new view on the effect of the capital gains tax in the entrepreneurial process.
We document evidence that is consistent with a selection effect of taxes for investments in venture
capital-backed companies. We do this by measuring the empirical association between the capital
gains tax and the number and success of venture capital investments. Our results indicate that
higher capital gains tax rates lead to a reduction in the number of companies receiving their first
investment and to a lower probability of receiving a follow-up investment. However, they also lead
to a selection effect: Higher capital gains tax rates at the time of the first funding are associated
with a higher probability of receiving follow-up funding and eventually being acquired or going
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public. Therefore, higher tax rates are correlated with fewer but, on average, more successful firms.
The venture capital industry is a special but important setting in which to learn about the effects
of tax policy. Governments around the world introduce programs to promote venture capital and
thus venture capital-financed start-up companies, because these are particularly innovative Kortum
& Lerner (2000). Unfortunately, evidence of the effectiveness of such state programs encouraging
venture capital is, at best, mixed (Lerner, 2009; Cumming, 2011; Da Rin et al., 2011b; DeGennaro,
2010). We add to this larger public policy debate that higher capital gains tax rates are associated
with a lower number of successful companies but increase the success probability of financed
companies. The reason is that the underlying firm population is heterogeneous and, in our setting,
higher taxes affect those companies with the lowest expected value the most. Thus higher taxes
are harmful, but not as harmful as basic estimates would suggest.
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Table 1: Estimated U.S. venture capitalists’ capital gains to total capital gains
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Proceeds U.S. IPOs ($ million) 50,600 12,900 6,600 5,000 43,600 36,600 67,200 61,600 3,200 8,600 105,500 88400 115600
U.S. VC-backed M&A price ($ million) 68,165.516,770.37,586.7 7,521.1 16,043.817,324.619,034.829,460 13,775.414,068.1
Total U.S. Capital Gains 644,285 349,441 268,615 323,306 499,154 690,152 798,214 924,164 497,841 263,460
Ratio VC Capital Gains/All Capital Gains 18.43% 8.49% 5.28% 3.87% 11.95% 7.81% 10.80% 9.85% 3.41% 8.60%
Source:
IPO: NVCA Yearbook 2013 (Post Offer Value)




Table 2: Country, number of firms, and time span
# firms Percent Time-span
USA 16,648 49.04 2000–2012
United Kingdom 2680 7.89 2000–2012
France 2,522 7.43 2000–2012
Germany 1,898 5.59 2000–2012
Canada 1,651 4.86 2002–2012
Korea 1,040 3.06 2005–2012
Sweden 911 2.68 2000–2012
Japan 736 2.17 2000–2012
Finland 689 2.03 2000–2012
Spain 681 2.01 2000–2012
Netherlands 540 1.59 2000–2012
Denmark 432 1.27 2000–2012
Israel 423 1.25 2003–2012
Italy 405 1.19 2000–2012
Australia 396 1.17 2005–2012
Belgium 342 1.01 2000–2012
Norway 334 0.98 2000–2012
Ireland 321 0.95 2000–2012
Switzerland 284 0.84 2000–2012
Portugal 217 0.64 2000–2012
Austria 213 0.63 2000–2012
Poland 170 0.50 2000–2012
Hungary 109 0.32 2000–2012
New Zeland 64 0.19 2000–2012
Greece 48 0.14 2000–2012
Turkey 39 0.11 2000–2012
Luxembourg 36 0.11 2000–2012
Iceland 32 0.09 2000–2012
Czech Republic 29 0.09 2000–2012
Mexico 26 0.08 2005–2012
Slovakia 23 0.07 2000–2012
Slovenia 10 0.03 2000–2012
Total 33949 100.00
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations: First round investments
mean sd min max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) # Firms 29.27 43.94 0 569 1.00
(2) % Success 13.01 15.32 0 100 0.04 1.00
(3) # Success 4.07 7.75 0 69 0.55*** 0.45*** 1.00
(4) Capital gains tax 19.22 11.52 0 50 0.18*** 0.02 0.16** 1.00
(5) Market-to-book ratio 1.93 0.73 1 6 0.20*** 0.16** 0.26*** 0.12* 1.00
(6) Income tax 37.29 9.68 0 60 -0.18*** 0.00 -0.13* -0.02 -0.07 1.00
(7) Corporate income tax 26.54 6.75 9 42 0.01 0.12* 0.11* 0.17** 0.06 0.39*** 1.00
(8) Dividend tax 21.60 12.51 0 60 0.14** 0.18** 0.20*** 0.10 0.02 0.14* -0.20*** 1.00
(9) GDP growth 0.54 2.26 -1 10 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 1.00
(10) Academic R&D 0.44 0.88 0 6 -0.01 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.23*** 0.06 0.28*** 0.05 -0.06 1.00
(11) Total R&D 1.51 3.91 0 24 -0.02 0.14* 0.07 0.01 0.23*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.05 -0.06 0.85*** 1.00
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlations: Follow-up rounds
mean sd min max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Investment 66.88 47.07 0 100 1.00
(2) Capital gains tax 19.69 6.58 0 60 -0.00 1.00
(3) Market-to-book ratio 2.68 1.04 0 6 0.19*** -0.02*** 1.00
(4) Income tax 37.64 7.42 0 70 -0.02*** 0.04*** 0.21*** 1.00
(5) Corporate income tax 31.81 5.52 9 42 0.15*** -0.15*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 1.00
(6) Dividend tax 27.07 8.30 0 60 0.01*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.28*** -0.19*** 1.00
(7) GDP growth 0.15 1.17 -1 10 -0.03*** 0.04*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.12*** 0.06*** 1.00
(8) Academic R&D 2.5 1.9 0 6 0.10*** -0.28*** 0.27*** -0.07*** 0.58*** -0.30*** -0.12*** 1.00
(9) Total R&D 10.2 9.4 0 24 0.07*** -0.19*** 0.37*** 0.00 0.54*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 0.77*** 1.00
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 5: Capital gains tax effects on the number of firms and their success
First round
# Firms # Success % Success
Initial capital gains tax -1.04∗∗∗ -0.29∗ 0.68∗∗
(0.33) (0.15) (0.25)
Market-to-book ratio 1.40 2.69∗∗ -0.77
(1.63) (1.28) (0.88)
Income Tax -0.24 -0.16∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.22) (0.08) (0.07)
Corporate income tax -0.13 -0.32∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.15) (0.08)
Dividend tax -0.06 -0.07 0.03
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
GDP growth -0.83 -0.18 0.26
(0.62) (0.19) (0.23)
Industrial R&D -0.61∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.05) (0.03)
Academic R&D 0.50 -0.76∗ -1.38∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.42) (0.42)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.77 0.78 0.91
N 394 394 368
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Capital gains tax effects on follow-up funding rounds
Follow-up investment
Investment Investment
Initial capital gains tax 0.48∗∗∗
(0.06)
Capital gains tax -1.64∗∗∗ -1.97∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.34)
Market-to-book ratio -1.02 -1.23
(1.78) (1.78)
Income tax 0.17 0.17
(0.27) (0.27)
Corporate income tax -0.31 -0.30
(0.19) (0.19)
Dividend tax -0.24 -0.24
(0.15) (0.15)
GDP growth -0.79 -0.83
(0.78) (0.77)
Industrial R&D -0.08 -0.11
(0.11) (0.11)
Academic R&D 1.88∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗
(0.77) (0.77)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.21 0.21
N 76,852 76,848
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Estimated effects for the years 2002 to 2008
Years 2002 to 2008 only
First round Follow-up
# Firms # Success % Success Investment Investment
Initial capital gains tax -1.59 -0.20∗∗ 0.67∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(1.01) (0.07) (0.36) (0.12)
Capital gains tax -1.87∗∗∗ -2.23∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.53)
Market-to-book ratio -5.77 0.80∗ 0.52 -2.09 -1.80
(6.72) (0.41) (1.50) (2.68) (2.72)
Income tax -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.46∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.06) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16)
Corporate income tax 0.01 -0.14∗∗ -0.34 0.00 0.01
(0.44) (0.06) (0.42) (0.31) (0.31)
Dividend tax -0.17 -0.08∗∗∗ 0.12 -0.60∗∗ -0.62∗∗
(0.24) (0.02) (0.10) (0.26) (0.26)
GDP growth -0.47 0.04 0.22 -0.35 -0.41
(0.37) (0.10) (0.32) (0.89) (0.87)
Industrial R&D -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.12 0.10
(0.27) (0.03) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18)
Academic R&D -0.23 -0.24 -0.31 1.38 1.73
(1.54) (0.17) (0.67) (1.05) (1.03)
Adj. R2 0.76 0.87 0.84 0.20 0.20
N 188 214 199 38,468 38,465
All regression include year and country fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Estimated effects of changes in the timing assumption
Lagged regressors Forward regressors
First round Follow-up First Round Follow-up
# Firms # Success % Success Investment Investment # Firms # Success % Success Investment Investment
Initial capital gains tax -1.04∗∗∗ -0.29∗ 0.53∗ -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.20 -0.70∗∗
(0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3)
Capital gains tax -1.77∗∗∗ -1.70∗∗∗ -0.08 0.02
(0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3)
Market-to-book ratio 1.40 2.69∗∗ 0.03 -1.51 -1.44 0.40 2.42∗ 0.98 -3.45 -2.57
(1.6) (1.3) (1.4) (1.9) (1.9) (1.5) (1.2) (1.5) (2.3) (2.0)
Income tax -0.24 -0.16∗ -0.09 0.17 0.18 -0.18 -0.14∗ -0.14 0.33 0.26
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.4) (0.3)
Corporate income tax -0.13 -0.32∗∗ -0.29∗ -0.20 -0.22 -0.08 -0.30∗∗ -0.33∗∗ -0.16 -0.15
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2)
Dividend tax -0.06 -0.07 0.13∗∗ -0.25 -0.25 -0.08 -0.08 0.15∗∗ -0.28 -0.23
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
GDP growth -0.83 -0.18 -0.38 -0.66 -0.66 -0.72 -0.15 -0.44 -0.62 -0.66
(0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.9) (0.9) (0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.9) (0.9)
Industrial R&D -0.61∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.15 -0.09 -0.08 -0.56∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ 0.13 -0.02 0.05
(0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Academic R&D 0.50 -0.76∗ -2.65∗ 0.32 0.32 0.31 -0.81∗ -2.52∗ 1.52∗ 1.39∗
(0.8) (0.4) (1.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.4) (1.5) (0.8) (0.8)
Adj. R2 0.77 0.78 0.66 0.20 0.20 0.76 0.77 0.65 0.20 0.20
N 394 394 368 76,852 76,848 394 394 368 76,852 76,852
All regressions include year and country fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9: Estimated effects for countries with more than 500 companies funded per year
More than 500 companies
First round Follow-up
# Firms # Success % Success Investment Investment
Initial capital gains tax -1.40∗∗ -0.31 0.84∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.25) (0.26) (0.06)
Capital gains tax -1.74∗∗∗ -2.10∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.40)
Market-to-book ratio 1.67 3.51∗∗ -0.99 -0.91 -1.09
(2.43) (1.41) (1.14) (2.20) (2.15)
Income tax -0.69∗ -0.33∗∗ -0.11 0.33 0.34
(0.32) (0.11) (0.09) (0.41) (0.41)
Corporate income tax -0.06 -0.30∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.45∗∗
(0.37) (0.15) (0.09) (0.19) (0.19)
Dividend tax -0.10 -0.15∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.30 -0.31
(0.13) (0.03) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20)
GDP growth -1.79 -0.36 0.44 -0.89 -0.95
(1.60) (0.49) (0.26) (1.08) (1.06)
Industrial R&D -0.51∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.11
(0.15) (0.06) (0.03) (0.13) (0.13)
Academic R&D -0.01 -0.52 -1.02∗∗ 1.65∗ 2.03∗∗
(1.09) (0.63) (0.45) (0.86) (0.85)
Adj. R2 0.79 0.83 0.95 0.20 0.20
N 156 156 156 71,578 71,574
All regression include year and country fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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